Who is Softbank?

The name Softbank has become synonymous with modern day technology companies, but who are they? Softbank was founded in 1981 by Masayoshi Son. In 2019, it sits as the 36th largest listed company in the world, larger than both Intel and Johnson & Johnson. As always, the company has somewhat humble beginnings, retailing computer parts in Japan before becoming a publisher. Eventually, the company became a dominant internet services and communications company after purchasing Vodafone Japan and Yahoo! Japan in the 2000’s.

The success of these acquisitions saw the renowned Masayoshi Son move front strength to strength and specialise in investments in high growth technology companies. Softbank was one of the earliest investors in Jack Ma’s Alibaba and retains a 29% shareholding today. They also have investments in US mobile provider, Sprint, ARM Holdings a British semi-conductor manufacturer and Chinese insurer Ping An. More recently though, Softbank has become a fund manager of sorts, raising two rounds of $100bn for their ‘Vision Fund’.

The Soft Bank Vision Fund 1 and 2, both seek to invest into venture capital investments on behalf of Softbank and external investors. One particularly dominant external investor is Saudi Arabia, as it seeks to diversify its fossil fuel reliant on economy. The fund aims to access venture capital and private equity on behalf of its diverse pool of Government and Investment Bank clients with a particular focus on artificial intelligence, robotics, data, financial technology and communications infrastructure.

Some of the most high profile investments made thus far include all three ride share services, Uber, Didi and Ola, as well as corporate technology Slack and Australian founded real estate ‘tech’ platform Compass. As we know, most of these companies are growing quickly but struggling to move towards profitability in an incredibly competitive market. Whilst the headlines are increasingly negative it is far too early to decide whether Softbank’s foray into being a VC fund manager is a success or failure at the  current time.

What happened to We Work?

In a world where accessing capital is as easy as it has ever been, it is those companies able to harness investors obsession with growth that demand the highest valuations. Increasingly, traditional companies like manufacturers, are seeking to affiliate themselves with technology buzzwords like big data, artificial intelligence and the internet of things. Yet, recent months have shown that astute investors are either tiring of high growth companies or have are more closely questioning their lofty growth predictions. We Work isn’t alone, but it’s a company worth taking a closer look at in light of last month’s events.

Moreover, an analysis of We Work wouldn’t be complete without introducing Softbank, one of the key backers of technology companies around the world.

What does We Work do?

We Work has a simple business model. They enter leases for entire buildings or floors in sought after areas of major global cities, refit or renovate these spaces and then seek to less them out to many smaller companies, entrepreneurs and creative types.

Their offering includes private offices and common meeting spaces, but the group generally owns no assets outside of the modern fit outs they deliver. So the business model is simple, rent spaces, create cool offices then sub lease these at a profit. The last part of this model being the hard part, as We Work haemorrhaged $220k per hour in 2018. In fact, the companies losses of $1.9bn exceeding their increasing revenue of $1.8bn, hence the need for constant capital injections.

The company was not unlike any other ‘technology’ company, albeit technology seemed to play only a small role. They were seeking to growth their scale sufficiently enough to eventually eek out strong profits in various ways with accounting and financial services two of these. The company attracts tenants out of home and cafes by offering printing services, free refreshments, coffee, office cleaning and hosting networking events in an effort to bring people together.  This all makes sense in an increasingly casualised employment sector but in our eyes, it is very simply a property leasing company.

The company is not unlike ServCorp who provide serviced offices, with the difference being ServCorp tends to lease existing office buildings, provide secretarial services and charges higher prices to do so. In our view, the We Work model may be fundamentally flawed. As the type of tenants that typically inhabit these spaces work for themselves, or are involved in venture capital companies, the majority of which are likely to fail.

Consider for instance the sector of financial advice. Financial advisers are dealing with sensitive information, both financial and emotional, on a daily basis. They must also securely store confidential client information behind several layers of protection. Whilst the private offices offered by We Work may be suitable for the former requirement, most would find it difficult to meet the secondary option. That is without considering the security of a shared internet connection.

Taking this a step further, the We Work approach typically does not attract the highest quality tenants; they attract those seeking to keep costs low and unwilling to commit to longer term leases. The very nature of these businesses is that if their business is under pressure they can simply walk away, flexibility not afforded to those leasing their own premises or employing staff.

So what went wrong?

Put simply, investors and fund managers saw through the technology haze. Upon receiving the prospectus for We Work, it was obvious to many investors that the company was still some way from profitability and required many things to go right in order for this to be achieve. In our experience, the technology sector is great at one thing, capturing the emotion of investors and employees alike, who see through their issues and only have eyes for the future.

In a time where passive or index management is dominating active decision makers, We Work reiterated their important role in the market. Active managers effectively decide whether companies like We Work and Latitude Financial become listed companies. It is these active managers that provide the capital that allows these new companies to list on stock exchanges and if it isn’t forthcoming, than the listing doesn’t happen. In comparison, a passive investor will buy any investment that enters their relevant index.

The company was seeking to list at a valuation of $48bn, but according to reports had some $49bn in rent payable in the coming months and insufficient cash to fund their operations for the next 12 months. Business Insider reported that We Work’s high profile CEO had actually trademarked the term ‘We’ and sold it to his company for close to $6m; red flags should no doubt have been seen then. Yet the business continued and eventually required a $9.5bn buyout from its majority shareholder Softbank. This saw the value of the company fall from close to $50bn to just $9.5bn in just a few hours.

After agreeing to the deal, Softbank paid some $1bn to the outgoing CEO and announced a ‘right-sizing’ of the business model. In plain English, right sizing means the company and management made poor decisions with shareholders capital that now need to be rectified. In We Work’s case, they appear to have taken on too many new offices and were having trouble leasing these out profitably. If this is the case in what is a generally supportive economic environment, it’s worrying what impact a recession would have on their business model.

As part of this right sizing, the new board axe 4,000 staff or 30% of the global workforce, and offered to buy back shares issued to employees based on an $8bn valuation for the company; most of these shares were issued at substantially higher levels.

As union funds and individual investors alike increase their allocation to high risk private equity and venture capital investments like We Work, many are questioning the longevity of this strategy. Most of these business will inevitably fail, it is simply par for course for this sector, so the question must be is now a good time to be increasing allocations?

Are transition to retirement pensions still relevant?

Transition to Retirement or TRIS pensions are commonly misunderstood by superannuation members and advisers alike. The TRIS legislation was introduced in the early 2000’s in an effort to ease the transition from full-time work into retirement for many Australian’s.

The eligibility was simple, if you had attained your preservation age, which ranged from 55 to 60, you were entitled to access your superannuation benefits on a ‘transitional’ basis. This transitional basis meant you could only draw on your superannuation balance as a ‘pension’ with a maximum withdrawal of 10% of your account balance per year.

By drawing this type of pension you were entitled to the same tax exemption as those in ‘full’ pension mode (i.e. post retirement). This meant all income and capital gains on assets supporting a TRIS pension would avoid the 15% superannuation income tax rate. The benefits were enormous, for those still working and over the age of 60, you were able to make pre-tax contributions, reducing your annual income tax bill, and replace this income by drawing a tax free pension from super.

In 2017, this strategy effectively came to an end. The legislation implemented from 1 July 2017, removed the tax exemption on assets supporting transition to retirement pensions. The result?  TRIS pensions are now only beneficial to a small group of retirees aged over 60 (and therefore drawing a tax-free pension) and who actually require the income they are drawing.

For instance, in the past most would commence a TRIS pension just obtain the tax exemption on all income within the fund and then replace the minimum pension drawdown with regular contributions. The imposition of the $1.6m balance cap and removal of this tax exemption has basically rendered the strategy useless.

As a side note, it’s worth keeping in mind that turning a TRIS pension into a full pension only requires the meeting of a full condition of release. These conditions include ‘retirement’ from full-time employment for any amount of time, attaining 65 years of age, or simply ceasing an employment arrangement that was already in place. For those changing profession or receiving redundancies late in their careers this can represent a great tax planning opportunity.

Advanced SMSF Strategy Doubling Up!

Because tax-concessional contributions to superannuation allow you to claim a tax deduction against personal income, they are a valuable entitlement for anyone wanting to minimize their taxable income. While the annual opportunity to make concessional contributions  is  restricted  to  just $25,000, there is a advanced strategy available where you can double this to $50,000 using a bring-forward strategy.

If you satisfy the “work test” and are under 70, you are able to make two tax-deductible concessional contributions in the same tax year to super-annuation including your (SMSF) as long as the first is paid in by March of the tax year.

A person who is eligible to make tax- concessional  contributions  to super –without a work test if they are under 65 or between 65 to 75 if they satisfy the “40 hours in 30 days” employment test – can make two sets of up to $25,000 tax-deductible contributions in one financial year. This obviously is a very effective way to manage a tax liability or event for funds held outstide superannuation.

The timing of the first contribution is not relevant, but that of the second is most important. It must happen in June to allow it to be allocated before July 28 in the following financial year. Super legislation requires member contributions to be applied to a member’s account within 28 days after the end of the month in which the contribution is made. The employment or work test requires someone to be gainfully employed – meaning they are paid for the work they do – for at least 40 hours in a period of 30 consecutive days in each financial year in which the contributions are made.

It needs to be executed in the right order

A fund can only split two concessional contributions between two financial years. If it is made in any other month it can’t be allocated to the next financial year.

Where  the  second contribution is made to an SMSF in June, it is possible to delay the application to a member’s super account until the next month which takes you into July in the next financial year. It is important the second contribution is quite separate from the first, which suggests it should be made on separate days to enable the contribution to be carried over.

One reason why this double contribution process might be followed is to achieve a higher tax deduction in a year when higher taxable income is received and a higher marginal tax rate applies relative to a normal year.

For instance say a couple owns a $2 million investment property purchased in joint names in 1990 with a cost base of $1.6 million. After applying the 50 per cent CGT discount, each member faces a taxable capital gain of $100,000. If  they  are  both  eligible   to   make $50,000 of personal concessional contributions to super through the reserving strategy, although the super fund will pay 15 per cent tax on these contributions, overall they will save $12,000 each in personal tax.

In specie transfer

Another time when the strategy can be attractive is where a member wishes to make an in specie transfer of shares owned outside super into their SMSF. While this allows them to keep a share portfolio intact, it can create personal tax CGT issues.

Allocating up to $50,000 of the in-specie transfer as concessional contributions  under  this reserving strategy can help manage this.

What is very important about this strategy is that each contribution should fall within the concessional contribution cap of $25,000 per annum, which also includes any employment-related contributions that have been received.

Care needs to be taken with any employment-related contributions which might be received in the subsequent financial year to ensure the $25,000 concessional cap is not breached.

Both contributions can be claimed as tax deductions in the year in which they are made. As far as the second contribution that is carried over to the next financial year, it is counted against the concessional cap in that year.

Don’t forget the paperwork

Appropriate Australian Taxation Office forms need to be completed to acknowledge the carryover of the contribution. The relevant form in this instance is a Request to adjust concessional contributions (NAT 74851-07.2015).

When reviewing the strategy as part of the annual audit, an SMSF auditor will firstly make sure any second  contribution  was  made  in June and then allocated to a member by the following July 28.

That an SMSF can claim both contributions in the year they are made is confirmed in an ATO interpretive decision ( ATO ID 2012/16) and a subsequent tax determination (TD 2013/22).

According to a guide that comes with the necessary ATO  Request to adjust concessional contributions form, an SMSF must record and keep documents to support the strategy.

This includes a resolution by trustees that states they have decided not to allocate the contribution when it is made but to accept it into a reserve in accordance with their fund’s governing rules.

This must be followed up with a resolution by trustees to allocate the contribution from the reserve in the next year.

In its guide to the strategy, the ATO says the form may be completed any time after the contributions have been made and allocated. It recommends it be lodged either before, or at the same time as, both the fund’s SMSF annual return and a member’s own individual income tax return.

By following this recommendation a member may avoid needing to deal with incorrect assessments.

This makes it another strategy where the more information you provide, the less chance there is of having the strategy queried by the ATO.

Paradigm Shifts

By Ray Dalio, Co-Chief Investment Officer & Co-Chairman of Bridgewater Associates, L.P.
Identify the paradigm you’re in, examine if and how it is unsustainable, and visualize how the paradigm shift will transpire when that which is unsustainable stops.


Over  my  roughly  50  years of being a global macro investor, I have observed there to be relatively long of periods (about 10 years) in which the markets and market relationships operate in a certain way (which I call “paradigms”) that most people adapt to and eventually extrapolate so they become overdone, which leads to shifts to new paradigms in which the markets operate more opposite than similar to how they operated during the prior paradigm. Identifying and tactically navigating these paradigm shifts well (which we try to do via our Pure Alpha moves) and/or structuring one’s portfolio so that one is largely immune to them (which we  try to do via our All Weather portfolios) is critical to one’s success as an investor.

There are always big unsustainable forces that drive the  paradigm.  They go on long enough for people to  believe  that  they  will  never  end even though they obviously must end. A  classic  one  of  those  is an unsustainable rate of debt growth that  supports  the  buying  of investment assets; it drives asset prices up, which leads people to believe that borrowing and buying those investment assets is a good thing to do. But it can’t go on forever because the entities borrowing and buying those assets will run out of borrowing capacity while the debt service costs rise relative to their incomes by amounts that squeeze their cash  flows.  When  these things happen, there is a paradigm shift. Debtors get squeezed and credit problems  emerge,  so  there  is a retrenchment of lending and spending on goods, services, and investment assets so they go down  in a self-reinforcing dynamic that looks more opposite than similar to the prior paradigm. This continues until it’s also overdone, which reverses in a certain way.

Another classic example that comes to mind is that extended periods of low volatility tend to lead to high volatility because people adapt to that low volatility, which leads them to do things (like borrow more money than they would borrow if volatility was greater) that expose them to more volatility, which prompts a self- reinforcing pickup in volatility. I want to emphasize that understanding which types of paradigms exist and how they might shift is required to consistently invest well.

That is because any single approach to investing—e.g., investing in any asset class, investing via any investment style (such as value, growth, distressed), investing in anything—will experience a time when it performs so terribly that it can ruin you. That includes investing in “cash” (i.e., short-term debt) of the sovereign that can’t default, which most everyone thinks is riskless but is not because the cash returns provided to the owner are denominated in currencies that the central bank can “print” so they can be depreciated in value when enough money is printed to hold interest rates significantly below inflation rates.

In paradigm shifts, most people get caught overextended doing something overly popular and get really hurt. On the other hand, if you’re astute enough to understand these shifts, you can navigate them well or at least protect yourself against them. The 2008-09 financial crisis, which was the last major paradigm shift, was one such period. It happened because debt growth rates were unsustainable in the same way they were when the 1929-32 paradigm shift happened. Because we studied such periods, we saw that we were headed for another “one of those” because what was happening was unsustainable, so we navigated the crisis well when most investors struggled.

I think now is a good time 1) to look at past paradigms and paradigm shifts and 2) to focus on the paradigm that we are in and how it might shift because we are late in the current one and likely approaching a shift. To do that, I wrote this report with two parts:

1) “Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts over the Last 100 Years”  and

2) “The Coming Paradigm Shift.” They are attached. If you have the time to read them both, I suggest that you start with “Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts over the Last 100 Years” because it will give you a good understanding of them and it will give you the evolving story that got us to where we are, which will help put where we are into context.

Part 1:

Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts over the Last 100 Years

History has taught us that there are always paradigms and paradigm shifts and that understanding and positioning oneself for them is essential for one’s well-being as an investor and beyond. The purpose of this piece is to show you market and economic  paradigms  and their shifts over the past 100 years to convey how they work. In the accompanying piece, “The Coming Paradigm Shift,” I explain my thinking about the one that might be ahead.

Due to limitations in time and space, I will only focus on those in the United States because they will suffice for giving you the perspective I’d like to convey. However, at some point I will show you them in all significant countries in the same way I did for big debt crises in Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises because I believe that understanding them all is essential for having a timeless and universal understanding of how markets and economies work.

How Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts Work

As you know, market pricing reflects expectations of the future; as such, it paints quite detailed pictures of what the consensus expectation of the future is. Then, the markets move as a function of how events transpire relative to those expectations. As  a result, navigating markets well requires one to be more accurate about what is going to happen than the consensus view that is built into the price. That’s the game. That’s why understanding these paradigms and paradigm shifts is so important.

I have found that the consensus view is typically more heavily influenced by what has happened relatively recently (i.e., over the past few years) than it is by what is most likely. It tends to assume that the paradigms that have existed  will  persist and it fails to anticipate the paradigm shifts, which is why we have such big market and economic shifts. These shifts, more often than not, lead to markets and economies behaving more opposite than similar to how they behaved in the prior paradigm.

What follows is my description of the paradigms and paradigm shifts in the US over the last 100 years. It includes a mix of facts and subjective interpretations, because when faced with the choice of sharing these subjective thoughts or leaving them out, I felt it was better to include them along with this warning label. Naturally, my degree of closeness to these experiences affects the quality of my descriptions.

Since my direct experiences began in the early 1960s, my observations of the years since then are most vivid. While less vivid, my understanding of markets and economies going back to the 1920s is still pretty good both because of my intense studying of it and because of my talking with the people of my parents’ generation  who  experienced  it. As for times before the 1920s, my understanding comes purely from studying just the big market and economic moves, so it’s less good though not nonexistent. Over the last year, I have been studying economic and market moves in major countries going back to about the year 1500, which has given me a superficial understanding of them.

With that perspective, I can say with confidence that throughout the times I have studied the same big things happen over and over again for essentially the same reasons. I’m not saying they’re exactly the same or that important changes haven’t occurred, because they certainly have (e.g., how central banks have come and gone and changed). What I am saying is that big paradigm shifts   have   always    happened and they happened for roughly the same reasons.

To show them, I have divided history into decades, beginning with the 1920s,  because  they  align well enough with paradigm shifts in order for me to convey the picture. Though not always perfectly aligned, paradigm shifts have coincidently tended to happen around decade shifts—e.g., the 1920s were “roaring,” the 1930s were in “depression,” the 1970s were inflationary, the 1980s were disinflationary, etc. Also, I believe that looking at 10-year time horizons helps one put things in perspective. It’s also a nice coincidence  that  we are in the last months of this decade, so it’s an interesting exercise to start imagining what the new 20s decade will be like, which is my objective, rather than to focus in on what exactly will happen in any one quarter or year.

Before briefly describing each of these decades, I want to convey a few observations you should look out for when we discuss each of them.

  • Every decade had its own distinctive characteristics, though within all decades there were long-lasting periods (e.g., 1 to 3 years) that had almost the exact opposite  characteristics  of what typified  the    To successfully deal with these changes, one would  have had to successfully time the ins and outs, or faded the moves (i.e., bought more when prices fell and sold more when prices rose), or had a balanced portfolio that would have held relatively steady through the moves. The worst thing would have been to go with the moves (sell after price declines and buy after price increases).
  • The big economic and market movements undulated in big swings that were due to a sequence of actions and reactions by policy makers, investors, business owners, and workers. In the process of economic conditions and market valuations growing overdone, the seeds of the reversals germinated. For example, the same debt that financed excesses in economic activity and market prices created the obligations that could not be met, which contributed to the declines. Similarly, the more extreme economic conditions became, the more forceful policy makers’ responses to  reverse them became. For these reasons, throughout these 10 decades we see big economic and market swings around “equilibrium” levels. The equilibriums I’m referring to are the three that I provided in my template, which are:

1. Debt growth that is in line with the income growth that is required to service debt;

2. The economy’s  operating  rate is neither too high (because that will produce unacceptable inflation and inefficiencies) nor too low (because economically depressed levels of activity  will produce unacceptable pain and political changes); and

3. The projected returns of cash are below the projected returns of bonds, which are below the projected returns of equities and the projected returns of other “risky assets” (because the failure of these spreads to exist will impede the effective growth of credit and other forms of capital, which will cause the economy to slow down or go in reverse, while wide spreads will cause it to accelerate).

  • At the end of each decade,  most investors expected the next decade to be similar to the prior decade, but because of the previously described process of excesses leading to excesses and undulations, the subsequent decades were more opposite than similar to the ones that preceded them. As a result, market movements due to these paradigm shifts typically were very large and unexpected and caused great shifts in
  • Every major asset class had great and terrible decades, so much so that any investor who had most of their wealth concentrated in any one investment would have lost almost all of it at one time or
  • Theories about how to invest changed frequently, usually to explain how the past few years made sense even when it didn’t make sense. These backward- looking theories typically were strongest at the end of the paradigm period and proved to be terrible guides for investing in the next decade, so they were very damaging. That is why it is so important to see the full range of past paradigms and paradigm shifts and to structure one’s investment approach so that it would have worked well through them The worst thing one can do, especially late in a paradigm, is to build one’s portfolio based on what would have worked well over the prior 10 years, yet that’s typical.

Below, I have summarized the picture of the dynamics for each decade with a very brief description and with a few tables that show asset class returns, interest rates, and economic activity for each decade over the last nine. Through these tables, you can get a feel of the dynamics for each decade.

1920s = “Roaring”: From Boom to Bursting  Bubble.  It  started with a recession and the markets discounting negative growth as stock yields were significantly above bond yields, yet there was fast positive growth funded by an acceleration in debt during the decade, so stocks did extremely well. By the end of the decade, the markets discounted fast growth and ended with a classic bubble (i.e., with debt-financed purchases of stocks and other assets at high prices) that burst in 1929, the last year of the decade.

1930s = Depression. This decade was for the most part the opposite of the 1920s. It started with the bursting reactions to  high  levels  of indebtedness and the markets discounting relatively high growth rates. This debt crisis and plunge in economic activity led to economic depression, which led to aggressive easing by the Fed that consisted of breaking the link to gold, interest rates hitting 0%, the printing of a lot of money, and the devaluing of the dollar, which was accompanied by rises in gold prices, stock prices, and commodity prices from 1932 to 1937. Because the monetary policy caused asset prices to rise and because compensation didn’t keep  up, the wealth gap widened,  a conflict between socialists and capitalists emerged, and there was the rise of populism and nationalism globally. In 1937, the Fed and fiscal policies were tightened a bit and the stock market and economy plunged. Simultaneously, the geopolitical conflicts between the emerging Axis countries of Germany, Italy, and Japan and the established Allied countries of the UK, France, and China intensified, which eventually led to all-out war in Europe in 1939 and the US beginning a war in  Asia in 1941. For the decade as a whole, stocks performed badly, and a debt crisis occurred early, which was largely handled via defaults, guarantees,   and    monetization  of debts along with a lot of fiscal stimulation.

1940s =  War  and  Post-War.  The economy and markets were classically war-driven. Governments around the world both borrowed heavily and printed significant amounts of money, stimulating both private-sector employment in support of the war effort and military employment. While production was strong, much of what was produced was used and destroyed in the war, so classic measures of growth and unemployment are misleading. Still, this war-effort production pulled the US out of the post-Great Depression slump.

Monetary policy was kept very easy to accommodate the borrowing and the paying back of debts in the post- war period. Specifically, monetary policy remained stimulative, with interest rates held down and fiscal policy liberally producing large budget deficits  during  the  war and then after the war to promote reconstruction abroad (the Marshall Plan). As a result, stocks, bonds, and commodities all rallied over the period, with commodities rallying the most early in the war, and stocks rallying the most later in the war (when an Allied victory looked to be more likely) and then at the conclusion of the war. The pictures of what happened in other countries, especially those that lost the war, were radically different and are worthy of description at another time.

After the war, the United States was the preeminent power and the dollar was the world’s reserve currency linked to gold, with other currencies linked to the dollar. This period is an excellent period for exemplifying 1) the power and mechanics of central banks to hold interest rates down with large fiscal deficits and 2) market action during war periods.

1950s  =  Post-War   Recovery.  In the 1950s, after  two  decades  of depression and war, most individuals were financially conservative, favoring security over risk-taking. The markets reflected this by de facto pricing in negative levels of earnings growth with very high risk premia (e.g., S&P 500 dividend yields in 1950 were 6.8%, more than 3 times the 10-year bond yield of 1.9%, and earning yields were nearly 14%). What happened in the ‘50s was exactly the opposite of what was discounted. The post-war recovery was strong (averaging 4% real growth over the decade), in part through continued stimulative policy/low rates. As a result, stocks did great. Since the government wasn’t running large deficits, government debt burdens (government debt as a percent of incomes) fell, while private debt levels were in line with income growth, so debt growth was in line with income growth. The decade ended in a financially healthy position, with prices discounting relatively modest growth and low inflation. The 1950s and the 1960s were also a period in which middle- class workers were in high demand and prospered.

1960s = From Boom to Monetary Bust. The first half of the decade was an increasingly debt-financed boom that led to balance of payments problems in the second half, which led to the big paradigm shift of ending the Bretton Woods monetary system. In the first half, the markets started off discounting slow growth, but there was fast growth so stocks did well until 1966. Then most everyone looked back on the past 15 years of great stock market returns and was very bullish. However, because  debt and economic growth were too fast and inflation was rising, the Fed’s monetary policy was tightened (e.g., the yield curve inverted for the first time since 1929). That produced the real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) peak in the stock market that wasn’t broken for 20 years. In the second half of the 1960s, debt grew faster than incomes and inflation started to rise with a “growth recession,” and then a real recession came  at  the end of the decade. Near the end of the ‘60s, the US balance of payments problem became more clearly manifest in gold reserves being drawn down, so it became clear that the Fed would have to choose between two bad alternatives—i.e.,

a) too tight a monetary policy that lead to a weak economy or b) too much domestic stimulation to keep the dollar up and inflation down. That led to the big paradigm shift of abandoning the monetary system and ushering in the 1970s decade of stagflation, which was more opposite than similar to the 1960s decade.

1970s = Low Growth and High Inflation (i.e., Stagflation). At the beginning of the decade, there was a high level of indebtedness, a balance of payments problem, and a strained gold standard that was  abandoned in 1971. As a result, the promise to convert money for gold was broken, money was “printed” to ease debt burdens, the dollar was devalued to reduce the external deficits, growth was slow and inflation accelerated, and inflation-hedge assets did great while stocks and bonds did badly during the decade. There were two big waves up in inflation, inflation expectations, and interest rates, with the first from 1970 to 1973 and the second and bigger one from 1977 to 1980-81. At the end of the decade, the markets discounted very high inflation and low growth, which was just about the opposite of what was discounted at the end of the prior decade. Paul Volcker was appointed in August 1979. That set the stage for the coming 1980s decade, which was pretty much the opposite of the 1970s decade.

1980s = High Growth and Falling Inflation (i.e., Disinflation). The decade started with the markets discounting  high  inflation  and  slow growth, yet the decade was characterized by falling  inflation  and fast growth, so inflation-hedge assets did terribly and stocks and bonds did great.  The  paradigm  shift occurred at the beginning  of the decade when the tight money conditions that Paul Volcker imposed triggered  a   deflationary   pressure, a  big  economic  contraction,  and   a debt crisis in which emerging markets were unable  to  service  their debt obligations to American banks. This was managed well, so banks were provided with adequate liquidity and debts weren’t written down in a way that unacceptably damaged  bank  capital.   However,  it created a shortage of dollars and capital flows that led the dollar to rise, and it created disinflationary pressures that allowed interest rates to decline while growth was strong, which was great for stock and bond prices. As a result, this was a great period for disinflationary  growth and high investment returns for stocks and bonds.

1990s = “Roaring”:  From  Bust to Bursting Bubble. This decade started off with a recession, the first Gulf War, and the easing of monetary policy and relatively fast debt-financed growth and rising stock prices; it ended with a “tech/ dot-com” bubble (i.e., debt-financed purchases of “tech” stocks and other financial assets at high prices) that looked quite like the Nifty Fifty bubble of the late 1960s. That dot- com bubble burst just after the end of the decade, at the same time there were the 9/11 attacks, which were followed by very costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2000-10  =  “Roaring”:  From Boom to Bursting Bubble. This decade was the most like the 1920s, with a big debt bubble leading up   to the 2008-09 debt/economic bust that was analogous  to  the  1929-  32 debt bust. In both cases, these drove interest rates to 0% and led   to central banks printing a lot of money and buying financial assets. The paradigm shift happened in 2008-09, when quantitative easing began as interest  rates  were  held  at or near 0%. The decade started with very high discounted growth (e.g., expensive stocks) during the dot-com bubble and was  followed by the lowest real growth rate of any of these nine decades (1.8%), which was close to that of the 1930s. As a result, stocks had the worst return of any other decade since the 1930s. In this decade, as in the 1930s, interest rates went to 0%, the Fed  printed    a lot of money as a way of easing with interest rates at 0%, the dollar declined, and gold and  T-bonds were the best investments. At the end of the decade, a very high level of indebtedness remained, but the markets were discounting slow growth.

2010-Now = Reflation. The shift to the new paradigm, which was also the bottom in the markets and the economy, came in late 2008/ early 2009 when risk premiums were extremely high, interest rates hit 0%, and central banks began aggressive quantitative easings (“printing money” and buying financial assets). Investors took the money they got from selling their  financial  assets to central banks and bought other financial assets, which pushed up financial asset prices and pushed down risk premiums and all asset classes’ expected returns. As in the 1932-37 period, that caused financial asset prices to rise a lot, which benefited those with financial assets relative to those without them, which widened the wealth gap. At the same time, technological automation and businesses globalizing production to lower-cost countries shifted wages, particularly for those in the middle- and lower-income groups, while more of the income gains over the decade went to companies and high-income earners. Growth was slow, and inflation remained low. Equities rallied consistently, driven by continued falling discount rates (e.g., from central bank stimulus), high profit margins (in part from automation keeping wage growth down), and, more recently, from  tax cuts. Meanwhile, the growing wealth and income gaps helped drive a global increase in populism. Now, asset prices are relatively high, growth is priced to remain moderately strong, and inflation is priced to remain low.


The tables above show a) the growth and inflation rates that were discounted at the beginning of each decade, b) growth, inflation, and other stats for each decade, c) asset class returns in both nominal and real terms, and d) money and credit ratios and growth rates of debt for each decade.

Part 2:

The Coming Paradigm Shift

The main forces behind the paradigm that we have been in since 2009 have been:

1. Central banks have been lowering interest rates and doing quantitative easing (i.e., printing money and buying financial assets) in ways that are unsustainable. Easing in these ways has been a strong stimulative force since 2009, with just minor tightenings that caused  “taper   tantrums.” That bolstered asset prices both directly (from the actual buying of the assets) and indirectly (because the lowering of interest rates both raised P/Es and led to debt-financed stock buybacks and acquisitions, and levered  up the buying of private equity  and real estate). That form of easing is approaching its limits because interest rates can’t be lowered much more and quantitative easing is having diminishing effects on the economy and the markets as the money that is being pumped in is increasingly being stuck in the hands of investors who buy  other investments  with it, which drives up asset prices and drives down their future nominal and real returns and their returns relative to cash (i.e., their risk premiums).

Expected returns and risk premiums of non-cash assets are being driven down toward the cash return, so there is less incentive to buy them, so it will become progressively more difficult to push their prices up. At the same time, central banks doing more of this printing and buying of assets will produce more negative real and nominal returns that will lead investors to increasingly prefer alternative forms of money (e.g., gold) or other storeholds of wealth.


As these forms of easing (i.e., interest rate cuts and QE) cease to work well and the problem of there being too much debt and non-debt liabilities (e.g., pension and healthcare liabilities) remains, the other  forms of easing (most obviously, currency depreciations  and  fiscal  deficits that are monetized) will become increasingly likely. Think of it this way: one person’s debts are another’s assets. Monetary policy shifts back and forth between a) helping debtors at the expense of creditors (by keeping real interest rates down, which creates bad returns for creditors and good relief for debtors) and b) helping creditors at the expense of debtors (by keeping real interest rates up, which creates good returns for creditors and painful costs for debtors). By looking at who has what assets and liabilities, asking yourself who the central bank needs to help most, and figuring out what they are most likely to do given the tools they have at their disposal, you can get at the most likely monetary policy shifts, which are the main drivers of paradigm shifts.

To me, it seems obvious that they have to help the debtors relative to the creditors. At the same time, it appears to me that the forces of easing behind this paradigm (i.e., interest rate cuts and quantitative easing) will have diminishing effects. For these reasons, I believe that monetizations of debt and currency depreciations will eventually pick up, which will reduce the value of money and real returns for creditors and test how far creditors will let central banks go in providing negative real returns before moving into other assets.

To be clear, I am not saying that this shift will happen immediately. I am saying that I think it is approaching and will have a big effect on what the next paradigm will look like.

The chart above shows interest rate and QE changes in the US going back to 1920 so you can see the two times that happened—in 1931-45 and in 2008-14.

The next three charts show the US dollar, the euro, and the yen since 1960. As you can see, when interest rates hit 0%, the money printing began in all of these economies. The ECB ended its QE program at the end of 2018, while the BoJ is still increasing the money supply. Now, all three central banks are turning to these forms of easing again, as growth is slowing and inflation remains below target levels.

2. There has been a wave of stock buybacks, mergers, acquisitions, and private equity and venture capital investing that has been funded by both cheap money and credit and the enormous amount of cash that was pushed into the system. That pushed up equities and other asset prices and drove down future returns. It has also made cash nearly worthless. (I will explain more about why that is and why it is unsustainable in a moment.) The gains in investment asset prices benefited those who have investment assets much more than those who don’t, which increased the wealth gap, which is creating political anti- capitalist sentiment and increasing pressure to shift more of the money printing into the hands of those who are not investors/capitalists.

3. Profit margins grew rapidly due to advances in automation and globalization that reduced the costs of labor. The chart on the top left shows that growth. It is unlikely that this rate of profit margin growth will be sustained, and there is a good possibility that margins will  shrink in the environment ahead. Because this increased share of the pie going to capitalists was accomplished by a decreased share of the pie going to workers, it widened the wealth gap and is leading to increased talk of anti-corporate, pro-worker actions.

4. Corporate tax cuts made stocks worth more because they give more returns (top right chart). The most recent cut was a one-off boost to stock prices. Such cuts won’t be sustained and there is a good chance they will be reversed, especially if the Democrats gain more power. These were big tailwinds that have supported stock prices. The bottom chart shows our estimates of what would have happened to the S&P 500 if each of these unsustainable things didn’t happen.

The Coming Paradigm Shift

There’s a saying in the markets that “he who lives by the crystal ball is destined to eat ground glass.” While I’m not sure exactly when or how the paradigm shift will occur, I will share my thoughts about it. I think that it is highly likely that sometime in the next few years, 1) central banks will run out of stimulant to boost the markets and the economy when the economy is weak, and 2) there will be an enormous amount of debt and non-debt liabilities (e.g., pension and healthcare) that will increasingly be coming due and won’t be able to be funded with assets. Said differently, I think that the paradigm that we are in will most likely end when a) real interest rate returns are pushed so low that investors holding the debt won’t want to hold it and will start to move to something they think  is better and b) simultaneously,  the large need for money to fund liabilities will contribute to the “big squeeze.” At that point, there won’t be enough money to meet the needs for it, so there will have to be some combination of large deficits that are monetized, currency depreciations, and large tax increases, and these circumstances will likely increase the conflicts between the capitalist haves and the socialist have-nots. Most likely, during this time, holders of debt will receive very low or negative nominal and real returns in currencies that are weakening, which will de facto be a wealth tax.

Right now, approximately 13 trillion dollars’ worth of investors’ money is held in zero or below-zero interest-rate-earning debt. That means that these investments are worthless for producing income (unless they are funded by liabilities that have even more negative interest rates). So these investments can at best be considered safe places to hold principal until they’re not safe because they offer terrible  real returns (which is probable) or because rates rise and their prices go down (which we doubt central bankers will allow).

Thus far, investors have been happy about the rate/return decline because investors pay more attention to the price gains that result from falling interest rates than the falling future rates of return. The diagram below helps demonstrate that. When interest rates go down right side of the diagram), that causes the present value of assets to rise (left side of the diagram), which gives the illusion that investments are providing good returns,  when  in reality the returns are just future returns being pulled forward by the “present value effect.” As a result future returns will be lower.

That will end when interest rates reach their lower limits (slightly below 0%), when the prospective returns for risky assets are pushed down to near the expected return for cash, and when the  demand for money to pay for debt, pension, and healthcare liabilities increases. While there is still a little room left for stimulation to produce a bit more of this present value effect and a bit more of shrinking risk premiums, there’s not much.

The enormous amounts of money in no- and low-returning investments won’t be nearly enough to fund the liabilities, even though the pile looks like a lot. That is because they don’t provide adequate income. In fact, most of them won’t provide any income, so they are worthless for that purpose. They just provide a “safe” place to store principal. As a result, to finance their expenditures, owners of them will have to sell  off principal, which will diminish the amount of principal that they have left, so that they a) will need progressively higher and higher returns on the dwindling amounts (which they have no prospect of getting) or b) they will have to accelerate their eating away at principal until the money runs out.

That will happen at the same time that there will be greater internal conflicts (mostly between socialists and capitalists) about how to divide the pie and greater external conflicts (mostly between countries about how to divide both the global economic pie and global influence). In such a world, storing one’s money in cash and bonds will no longer be safe. Bonds are a claim on money and governments are likely to continue printing money to pay their debts with devalued money. That’s the easiest and least controversial way to reduce the debt burdens and without raising taxes. My guess is that bonds will provide bad real and nominal returns for those who hold them, but not lead to significant price declines and higher interest rates because I think that it is most likely that central banks will buy more of them to hold interest rates down and keep prices up. In other words, I suspect that the new paradigm will be characterized by large debt monetizations that will be most similar to those that occurred in the 1940s war years.

So, the big question worth pondering at this time is which investments will perform well in a reflationary environment accompanied by large liabilities coming due and with significant internal conflict between capitalists and socialists, as well as external conflicts. It is also a good time to ask what will be the next- best currency or storehold of wealth to have when most reserve currency central bankers want to devalue their currencies in a fiat currency system.

Most people now believe the best “risky investments” will continue to be equity and equity-like investments, such as leveraged private equity, leveraged real estate, and venture capital, and this is especially true when central banks are reflating. As a result, the world is leveraged long, holding assets that have low real and nominal expected returns that are also providing historically low returns relative to cash returns (because of the enormous amount of money that has been pumped into the hands of investors by central banks and because of other economic forces that are making companies flush with cash). I think these are unlikely to be good real returning investments and that those that will most likely do best will be those that do well when the value of money is  being  depreciated and domestic and international conflicts are significant, such as gold. Additionally, for reasons I will explain in the near future, most investors are underweighted in such assets, meaning that if they just wanted to have a better balanced portfolio to reduce risk, they would have more of this sort of asset. For this reason, I believe that it would be both risk-reducing and return- enhancing to consider adding gold to one’s portfolio.

Too Much Money Chasing Too Little Growth

‘Negative yielding debt balloons to $15 trillion’ – CNBC

No you didn’t misread that quotation, the value of bonds around the world that investors are willing to lose money by purchasing now exceeds USD$15 trillion. Is it simply the start of another trend, or is it something we should be concerned about?

Everywhere you look around the world investors are being forced into higher risk assets in the search for income and growth from their capital. They are doing this because unconventional monetary   policy is bringing cash, bond and other associated interest rates ever closer to 0%. For instance, in Australia you receive just 0.8% on an at call account or 1.6% for a multi-year term deposit.

Why is this happening? Policymakers and economists believe that by making saving money such a poor investment decision they will be forced to consume, invest or generally stimulate the economy. Yet after a decade of these policies both the US, Europe and Japan are all staring at unexpected recessions. There is a growing consensus that these policies are simply inflated the value of risky assets and delaying the inevitable, a view we believe has some merit.

In this issue of Unconventional Wisdom we have sought to highlight both areas where we believe risk has been forgotten in this never ending search for yield and opportunities that offer more appropriate risk- reward profiles in this increasing difficult environment. For the remainder of this article, however, we will  highlight  and  summarise a few key themes that are of growing concern to our Investment Committee.

Credit Ratings

One of the most interesting recent developments was the seeming repeat of past mistakes by the major credit ratings agencies around the world. It seems the multi-billion dollar fines issued following to many of these agencies following the GFC have not been enough to force a more transparent approach to risk assessment.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the introduction of more competitors in the credit ratings space  has simply seen their recommendations become more aggressive in the pursuit of growth.  For  instance, the new competitors in the  sector are consistently providing higher credit ratings than the old fashioned duopolies.  As  always,  they   are paid and employed based on the ‘recommendations’ they provide. Now, this may  be  well  and  good for institutions with their own risk management teams, yet as usual those most likely to lose out are the retail investors who inevitably  end up in the products full of these newly issued bonds.

Margin Debt

Along with credit ratings, the proliferation of margin debt, or margin lending in Australian terms, was one of the many factors that contributed to the eventual depth of the GFC. It is margin lending, where the only security offered for a loan is a portfolio of listed and therefore volatile securities that contributes to wild market swings.

This is because market falls result in margin calls on investor accounts and with most people unwilling to contribute additional capital at these times their portfolios tend to be sold off. As can be seen in the chart above, margin debt in the US has followed the S&P 500’s march to all-time highs, with levels now far exceeding those before the GFC and until recently, growing at a substantially faster pace.

Margin debt alone isn’t necessarily a bad thing and as many readers will now, if margin debt grows at the same pace as the market then the loan to valuation ratio should remain the same; so investors aren’t necessarily taking on more risk than usual. The bigger question in this case is whether market valuations are inflated, driven by ever lower interest rates, meaning the experienced volatility of these strategies may be substantially higher.

ETF’s, leverage and synthetics

The huge growth in ETF’s may actually be increasing the risk of margin lending strategies, as they tend to give no consideration to value, allocate more capital to  businesses as they become more expensive and react automatically to changes in the market. Further to this, the search for yield and a growing concern for volatility has spawned an increasing number of leveraged and synthetic products. By leverage, we  mean these ETF’s (and some managed funds for that matter) either borrow funds, employ long-short strategies or through various derivatives take your market exposure as high as 300% of the capital you invested. In terms of synthetic, this refers to ETF’s and listed investment companies that don’t actually hold the assets to which they provide an exposure. One example would be those securities offering exposure to the Volatility or VIX index and some single commodity exposures, which own futures or options, rather than the underlying commodities. It is yet to be  seen how these securities will react when markets really get volatile.

Availability of illiquid products

As the search for yield intensifies, investors are increasing being offered less liquid products. For instance, the industry fund HOST Plus, recently launched an SMSF Invest option that allows their main competitors to invest into the Direct Infrastructure investment option. Interestingly, it has been this investment option, managed by Industry Funds  Management, that  has delivered  c10%   returns for the last decade and been the driver of that sectors out-performance over the same period.

So why now, after seeing interest rates fall from close to around 7% to 0% and increase the value of these assets substantially, has the fund decided to offer access to everyone else. In addition to this option, the likes of AMP Capital, Infrastructure Partners Investment Fund and many others are bringing these options typically reserved to pension funds to the masses. Is it a sign of greed, seeking to capitalise on the search for yield? Or is it really a good time to be investing in illiquid, interest rate sensitive assets.

Classification of risk

As is the case in  any  market boom, the classification of what is considered high or low risk becomes increasing  stretched.  One  needs to look no further than the pages of Australian Financial Review  and the many advertisements throughout. In this case, we aren’t referring to the regular plastering of the increasingly irrelevant, vertically integrated Evan’s Dixon financial advisers, but rather the series of products offering incredible yields as an alternative to term deposits. The case in point is IPO Wealth, an investment opportunity that is restricted to wholesale investors,  or those with over $2.5m to invest. The headline itself attracts people due to the appearance of exclusivity; yet it isn’t exclusive at all. As an investor in IPO Wealth, you will receive a return of 3.75% on the  12 month option or 4.95% for the five year option; sounds great right? Perhaps   if   you   are  comfortable investing into high risk pre-IPO smaller companies, as that’s what your investment is used for. Your contribution to the fund will be lent to business seeking to list on the ASX in future years, many of which may not. According to external research the fund is structured such that if the investments are successful, your return will be capped, and if it is not, you will be fully exposed to the downside risk…..IPO Wealth has recently been joined by its sister company Mayfair Platinum, which appears to offer a similar product.

Complex Debt Products

The reduction in lending by the major banks has resulted in a surge in the non-bank lending sector. As the increased demand for loans increases, so does the need for capital. The result has been the likes of Wingate Partners, Trilogy Funds, Latrobe Financial and Think Tank, entering the market with high yielding products. Now we aren’t saying there is anything wrong with these products, but its important for investors to understand what they are investing into. The funds issued by each of these managers are used to fund loans, some simply mortgages but others mezzanine construction finance, unsecured corporate lending and the like. Further, many of these products are tranched in that different investors agree to different terms in the event of capital loss, in return for higher or lower expenses. The structures are complex and not for the uninitiated. Take for instance the recent bankruptcy of developer Ralan, which owed $500m to creditors including Wingate Partners and Westpac. We’d suggest these events will only become more regular in the years ahead.

Questionable Investments

We will highlight this in greater detail later in this issue, however, recent conversations with a number of industry participants raised some concerns about a number of highly popular investment strategies. The first was the growing Peer to Peer lending sector, where an investor is able to lend directly to a borrower, outside of the restrictions of a bank. This all sounds well and good, however, the question is why these people aren’t borrowing from  a bank rather than paying the 10-20% interest they are charged. We heard anecdotal evidence of soon to be incarcerated borrowers taking out hefty loans, borrowers taking loans to pay out other loans and defaults increasing exponentially. The second case, was the recent ASX-listing in the ever popular Listed Investment Company space. The fund was promising an incredible yield through a diversified portfolio of loans to corporate businesses, but looking more  closely  the entire   portfolio of loans was below BBB and not considered investment grade. As we highlight later, the probably of default as companies move from AAA to CCC grows quickly.

Inflated company valuations

Many people will say we are simply jealous that we missed  out  on  the incredible growth of the likes of Afterpay; yet the companies valuation beggars belief. It doesn’t have a price earnings ratio because it has never made a profit. The company is now valued at $5.9bn, making it the same size as AMP, which has over $300bn in assets under management, yet all it does is offer a technologically advanced lay- by service. Of increasing concern is the manner in which investors are reacting to bad news in relation to this and other similar growth companies. When news of inappropriate loans, increasing delinquencies, the legal appointment or external auditors or reprimands from the Australian Money  Laundering  Task  Force are announced, the company simply continues to march higher. What is most concerning to us in the case of Afterpay, has been the ‘changing of the guard’ that has occurred in last 6 to 12 months and highlighted by Commsec. Basically, the early backers of Afterpay, being institutions, fund managers and sophisticated investors, have been selling out quickly with the buyers being mum and dad retail investors trading through Comsec.

Companies reaching too far for growth

As experienced before the GFC, management and boards have a tendency to be overly enthusiastic about investment opportunities when money is cheap.  Some notable examples last time around were the likes of Slater and Gordon expanding into the UK (and nearly going bankrupt), Newcrest buying the troublesome PNG Lihir mine and BHP Billiton making its ill-fated expansion into the shale oil sector. The story seems to be coming around again with a number of culprits domestically and globally popping up. Consider for example Japan  Post’s  purchase of Toll Holdings and subsequent writedown by $4.7bn, electricity retailer Origin Energy’s cancelled acquisition of telecommunications provider Vocus Group, after stating that its service was considered a ‘new type of infrastructure’. More recently Wesfarmers, free from its disastrous UK expansion and the sale of Coles Group, announced offers for a number of high risk commodity plays linked to the still unfounded battery storage thematic.

‘It’s only natural’

As Crowded House sang in 1991 during our last recession, it’s only natural that  we  should  seek  yield  in an interest starved world. It’s all well and good to benefit from higher returns in the short-term whilst the economies supporting these markets remain solid, but will the relative peace continue? Or are we bound for a difficult period for markets? If your concerned about the US trade war  or the growing likelihood of a global recession, it will pay to know exactly what it is you are invested into.

Is your fund manager any good?

The investment markets are an incredibly complex world for DIY investors, but none more so than the managed fund and listed investment company sectors. Managed funds can provide important diversification and access to highly skilled and dedicated professional managers at a reasonable cost, however, there are many funds in Australia that do little but charged high fees for below average performance. This is best evidenced by the regular Standard and Poor’s analysis suggesting the majority of Australian equity managed funds underperform their index over most periods.

What this analysis excludes though, is the fact that many of these ‘active’ managers actually do nothing of the sort. So we thought it appropriate to introduce two ratios that we value when assessing professional fund managers all over the world; Active share and portfolio turnover.

Active Share

As is typically the case in finance, the measure of active share was invested by two Yale professors in 2006. Active share is a holdings-based statistic that seeks to measure how different an equity portfolio is from its benchmark as well as the proportion of a portfolio that drives performance. Put simply, it measures the ‘fraction’ of a portfolio, whether your own shares or a managed fund, that differs from the benchmark, like the S&P500 or the ASX 200. An example is shown in the table below:

Share Portfolio Benchmark Difference Active Share
ABC 80% 50% 30%  
DEF 10% 50% 40%  
GHI 10% 0% 10%  
Sum 100% 100% 80%/2 40%


As you can see, active share is calculated by taking the sum of the difference between all of the holdings in the portfolio and those of the benchmark. This is then divided by 2 to avoid double counting. The result in this case being that fund has an active share of 40%, with the remaining 60% considered the passive share or replication of the index. The authors of the study concluded that an active share of 20% to 60% is actually closet indexing, whilst under 20% was as good as being completely passive.

Why is it important? Without going into too much detail, the study and several subsequent analyses found that one of the most common traits of investment managers that regularly outperform their benchmarks and deliver better than average returns to investors was a high active share of over 80%. This is reflected in their willingness to take risks and invest into higher conviction portfolios. The study summarised the conclusion as follows: “funds with the highest Active Share significantly outperformed their benchmarks, both before and after expenses, and they exhibited strong performance persistence.”  

Portfolio Turnover

The second and more straightforward measure is Portfolio Turnover. As the name suggests, it records how frequently the assets within a fund or portfolio are bought and sold. It is calculated simply by dividing the total amount of new securities bought or sold during a period by the net asset value of the fund.

As you would expect, the rate of portfolio turnover is important for investors to consider, as high turnover will generally result in higher fees due to the level of daily management and brokerage required. They also typically incur higher capital gains that must be distributed to investors.

Similarly to Active Share, those funds with lower portfolio turnover have tended to outperform their benchmarks and do so more consistently over the long-term. This is generally due to the managers having higher conviction in their holdings, not unlike a buy and hold investor.